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Abstract Fire safety expertise was in great demand following the Grenfell Tower 
fire in London in June 2017. The government established a review of building regu-
lations and an expert panel to inform its responses to Grenfell, and many other rele-
vant organisations also formed their own expert panels. However, expert knowledge 
in fire safety is a highly contested domain, with knowledge claims based on differ-
ing sources. Fire fighters can claim expertise based on their experience of fighting 
fires, scientists and science-based engineers can claim expertise from experimenta-
tion, and those who create and enact regulations can claim expertise in what can 
termed ’codespeak’—the language of regulation. Although distanced from funda-
mental empirical experience of fire, codespeak is powerful because of its relative 
clarity and certainty, and legal status. Building users also bring their own form of 
‘local’ expertise—they have first-hand experience of the practicalities of the solu-
tions wrought by the other experts. Policy-makers thus face many competing forms 
of expert advice on fire safety, and their ability to judge what is most relevant in any 
particular case rests on the existence of a sufficient range and depth of in-house gov-
ernment expertise.
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Introduction
Since 72 people died in the Grenfell Tower fire in June 2017, fire safety has been 
at the top of the agenda in the UK construction industry. The Metropolitan Police 
and the Public Inquiry continue to investigate the circumstances surrounding the 
fire, and the Ministry of Housing Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) 
has taken steps to identify and address latent risks within existing buildings. 
MHCLG also commissioned an Independent Review of Building Regulations and 
Fire Safety, led by Dame Judith Hackitt, to identify what regulatory changes may 
be required in the construction industry.
What each of these activities have required is people with appropriate exper-
tise. The government quickly established an Independent Expert Advisory Panel, 
the Metropolitan Police engaged the services of a forensic investigator (BRE 
Global), and the Public Inquiry appointed 17 expert witnesses. Meanwhile the 
Hackitt Review drew on ‘over 250 submissions [that] were received from a 
diverse range of stakeholders, including the construction, housing and fire sec-
tors, independent experts in relevant fields and residents’ (Hackitt 2018: 140). 
Following the government’s lead, many professional and membership organisa-
tions also established their own expert panels. For example, the Royal Institute 
of British Architects, Construction Product Association, Construction Industry 
Council, and Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors have all convened expert 
panels on fire safety.
This hurried assembly of expert panels raises questions about the nature of the 
expertise involved, and the role that the experts perform in informing fire safety 
governance. These experts are potentially important because their advice may be 
influential in shaping industry best practice, regulation, and government policy in 
general; and ultimately because of the effect on safety outcomes. It thus matters 
whether they conform to normative expectations of experts—that they are both 
specialists in a particular knowledge domain but also impartial and thus trustwor-
thy (Grundmann 2017: 26).
Following Grenfell, public outcry, media speculation, and expert commentary 
addressed a variety of perceived problems with UK fire safety, including broader 
issues of inequality, austerity, and deregulation (Hodkinson 2019; MacLeod 2018). 
In this paper we focus on one particular outcome of expert advice following Gren-
fell: the decision to revise building regulations to ban combustible cladding on cer-
tain classes of building above 18 m. There are separate debates to be had about the 
test methods that can be used to support the use of materials and products within 
buildings (e.g. Brannigan 2008), and whether industry has made use of such tests 
and their data in an ethical manner (Booth 2018). Here we focus solely on the expert 
advice that led to the ban. This ban was the first (and as of March 2021 the only) sig-
nificant change made to building regulations following Grenfell, and what is particu-
larly noteworthy is that it flew in the face of the recommendations of government-
commissioned expert advice, including the influential Hackitt Review.
Our argument is as follows. Policy-makers often face complex challenges, rely-
ing on expert advice that may stem from diverse knowledge domains. From the 
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perspective of policy-makers, such challenges can be seen as ‘ill-structured prob-
lems’ (Simon 1973) if it is unclear how to frame the challenge and what expertise 
is most relevant. Expert advice will thus appear particularly useful if it enables 
the policy-maker to structure and formalise a problem—turning an ill-structured 
problem (ISP) into a well-structured problem (WSP)—because as (Simon 1973: 
186) argues, ‘there are no WSPs, only ISPs that have been formalized for problem 
solvers’.
The challenge of fire safety regulation following Grenfell might seem to be a 
well-structured problem because the desired outcome appears straightforward. Over-
all, it can be summarised by the statement made by Minister of State for Policing 
and the Fire Service Nick Hurd following Grenfell ‘to ensure that people in similar 
buildings are safe’ (Hurd 2017). More specifically, in relation to the cladding ban 
at the heart of this paper, the desired outcome is described in functional require-
ment B4 of the Building Regulations as: ‘The external walls of the building shall 
adequately resist the spread of fire over the walls and from one building to another, 
having regard to the height, use and position of the building’.
However, even defining what is meant by ‘safe’ or to ‘adequately resist the spread 
of fire’ is challenging, never mind deciding how to obtain such outcomes. Both 
safety and adequate resistance to fire spread are subjective outcomes whose reali-
sation hinges on the method of implementation. For example, it is not practical to 
ensure that building occupants are completely ‘safe’; not only are buildings designed 
to meet multiple (sometimes competing) performance goals, but also home dwell-
ers are free to accumulate combustible materials and to indulge in risky behaviour. 
Furthermore, any government spending will involve opportunity costs with regard to 
other potential societal benefits (e.g. in road safety).
Historically, fire safety precautions became designed into the built environment 
through the use of building codes with prescriptive rules whereby a particular class 
of building (e.g. an apartment block above a certain height) had to incorporate 
specified fire safety measures. Implementing such rules does not require a build-
ing designer to understand what they are doing or how it affects safety. The alter-
nate to a rule-following approach is to focus on performance outcomes and ensure 
that fire safety design is carried out and/or regulated by competent practitioners with 
adequate understanding of the relevant processes. Such an approach to regulation 
relies not on rules requiring specific fire safety precautions, or on the banning of 
certain materials, but on judgements as to whether performance outcomes have been 
achieved, and in the event of a fire, whether conditions would remain tenable long 
enough for occupants to escape.
Since the mid-1980s, English fire safety regulation has been an uneasy hybrid 
of these two approaches with performance outcomes expressed as subjective func-
tional requirements, but with most designers relying on prescriptive rules set out in 
Approved Documents that provide guidance for ‘more common types of building’. 
Grenfell exposed weaknesses in this regulatory system across a wide range of issues, 
and addressing these failings poses a complex challenge for policy-makers. What to 
do about fire safety regulation following Grenfell thus constitutes an ill-structured 
problem for government because it is ‘a problem whose structure lacks definition 
in some respect’ (Simon 1973: 181). The difficulty of defining desirable fire safety 
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outcomes is compounded by the challenge of choosing appropriate regulatory mech-
anisms aimed at producing those outcomes.
After describing some key issues with the role of experts, we set out a typology 
of fire safety expertise in order to demonstrate how diverse practitioners can claim 
to offer useful expert advice. We then describe the role of government-sponsored 
experts following Grenfell, and the contrasting approach taken by the Royal Institute 
of British Architects (RIBA) with its strong advocacy for prescriptive solutions. Our 
argument is that analysis of these cases shows how the idea of banning combusti-
ble materials proved successful because it made a complex, ill-structured problem 
appear straightforward.
Conceptualising Experts and Expertise
Incidents such as the Grenfell Tower fire highlight the important role that gov-
ernment can and should play in mitigating risk. Technological innovation brings 
many benefits to society, but often also involves potential risks. For some risks, 
attitudes vary as to what extent government should intervene through regulation 
or other mechanisms, but in the case of fire there has historically been little doubt. 
As humans created urban settlements of increasing size, it eventually became clear 
that fire was a shared problem, and not one that should be left entirely to individual 
choice (Bankoff et al. 2012).
If government is to take action on protecting its citizens from risks, then it needs 
to understand what these risks are and how they can be mitigated. The role of exper-
tise in risk governance thus hinges on two types of activity: the production of appro-
priate knowledge; and its communication to policy-makers. For such a mechanism 
to work well these two processes should be linked; those with appropriate knowl-
edge should be the ones that government turns to for expert advice.
Although expert knowledge is a communal achievement, it can also be seen as an 
individual attribute. Those who have the highest levels of expertise appear, on the 
face of it, well suited to provide expert advice. Individuals acquire expertise through 
education and experience, and important signifiers of its possession can be seen in 
professional accreditation or academic status. Both Chartered Engineer and Univer-
sity Professor are in their own ways (sometimes for the same individual) titles that 
should indicate a person has attained a high level of expertise in a particular field.
However, the possession of such status, and the attainment of expertise thus sig-
nified, does not an expert make. Expertise is not the same as expertness because 
who gets to be seen as an expert depends more on social relationships than indi-
vidual attributes. In this perspective, expertness depends on social context and the 
relationship between those seeking expert advice and those purporting to be able to 
provide it. As Martin (1973: 159) put it: ‘Expertness is an ascribed quality, a badge, 
which cannot be manufactured and affected by an expert himself, but rather only can 
be received from another, a client’.
According to this viewpoint, what makes an expert hinges on their potential 
utility to those seeking expert advice. A key issue then is who gets to be con-
sidered an expert for a particular problem, and what attributes confer ‘epistemic 
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authority’ (Slayton 2003; Spinardi 2013). While the acquisition of high levels of 
expertise typically requires specialisation, policy problems rarely confine them-
selves to such siloed perspectives. Specialist knowledge is clearly important, but 
it also matters that the perceived expertise of an individual is considered rele-
vant to the issue facing policy-makers. Policy challenges typically impinge on 
several knowledge domains, and can thus be seen as what Simon (1973) termed 
‘ill-structured problems’. If an expert can ‘decompose’ such problems to provide 
apparent clarity then this may make their advice seem more useful.
Indeed, a distinctive aspect of expert advice compared with normal scientific 
practice is that it usually demands certainty. Faced with competing solutions and 
costs, politicians must take decisions. Some difficult decisions (such as that con-
cerning a third runway for London’s Heathrow airport) can be deferred, pending 
further investigation, but when the risks are potentially large, or public outcry is 
vociferous, decisions need to be taken quickly. For example, the appearance of 
‘mad cow’ disease in the UK in the late 1980s posed a classic expertise/govern-
ance challenge because decisions about banning human consumption of British 
beef required urgent attention in a context where there was little scientific under-
standing of the nature of disease and its potential risk to humans (Seguin 2000). 
A premature ban would have had significant economic impacts, and damaging 
effects on the livelihoods of many farmers, but a failure to ban could have resulted 
in large numbers of human deaths. While the scientific tradition embraces uncer-
tainty because knowledge gaps help to focus future research, policy-making usu-
ally requires ‘closure’ around definitive recommendations.
Expertness would thus appear to require relevant knowledge in an appropriate 
domain, but an aptitude to distance oneself from the uncertainties of cutting-edge 
research. This accords with the ‘certainty trough’ phenomenon, whereby those 
slightly removed from the site of knowledge production have the lowest perceived 
uncertainty as to related knowledge claims (MacKenzie 1990). Although those 
within the ‘core set’ (Collins 1985) of specialist practitioners are best placed to 
make complex judgements, those slightly removed are more able to speak with 
certainty unclouded by the fine details. They may not have the type of expertise 
necessary to carry out cutting edge research, but they are sufficiently conversant 
with the field to pass as experts. In the terminology of Collins and Evans (2007: 
14), they possess ‘interactional expertise’, if not ‘contributory expertise’.
To sum up, in this view of expertness, expertise per se is not the only require-
ment. Policy-makers may seek out specialists, but the ability to provide clear 
solutions to problems, decisiveness, fluency with technical language, and appar-
ent impartiality are qualities that are also important. From the policy-maker’s per-
spective, the approach to choosing (and using) experts will also be shaped by their 
political aims. When it is expedient to be seen to be doing something, but unde-
sirable to reach a definite conclusion, then assembling an expert committee with 
the leading specialists in a range of disciplines may well have the desired effect 
of leading to prolonged discussion and recommendations mainly focussed on the 
need for more research! Where urgent and definitive outcomes are required, the 
aforementioned qualities may be more desirable in potential experts.
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However, while this view of expertness as being an ‘ascribed quality’ captures 
many key features of the relationship between experts and policy-makers, it depicts 
potential experts as passive recipients of expert status. Turning to the specific con-
text of the role of experts following the Grenfell Tower fire, it is clear that the forma-
tion of several expert panels, by a number of organisations as well as government, 
shows that claims to expert status play an important role in a broader social context, 
and that the performance of expertness is an active process.
Indeed, most of the expert panels established following Grenfell do not owe their 
claims to expert status to their direct relationship with government. Instead the 
proliferation of experts demonstrates more complex organisational motivations, in 
which the performance of expertness serves a number of functions. The key ques-
tion in this jockeying for claims of expertness lies in its significance for affecting 
actual policy outcomes. How do governments respond when presented with compet-
ing expert advice? To what extent is it necessary to have the highest level of exper-
tise—what Collins and Evans (2007) call ‘contributory expertise’—in order to have 
impact as an ‘expert’? Or can other attributes of expertness, deployed skilfully, affect 
policy outcomes? In particular, could the ability to provide straightforward solutions 
to apparently complex challenges be crucial in conferring epistemic authority?
Claims to Fire Safety Expertise
Although expertness can be seen as a socially ascribed property, knowledge claims 
play a significant role in who is seen to be an expert. However, for policy-makers, 
in the terminology of Simon (1973), fire safety presents particularly ‘ill-structured 
problems’ because knowledge is obtained from disparate sources, all with their dis-
tinct limitations. Three main types of knowledge are important (a fourth, that we 
discuss later, perhaps should be more important). These are knowledge based on 
fighting fires, knowledge based on enacting regulations, and knowledge based on 
scientific investigation of fire and its effects.
The most authentic source of data is actual fires, and traditionally those who fight 
fires and investigate fire scenes have had a strong claim to experiential expertise. 
As fire services became institutionalised as public organisations, so this expertise 
became organisationally strengthened. To the extent that anyone could claim to be 
an expert in fire safety, fire fighters could, and their claim to be experts was solidi-
fied when the formation of the Institution of Fire Engineers (IFE) was initiated in 
1918, not by engineers, but by Chief Fire Officers. This view was encapsulated in the 
UK by the Report of the Department Committee on the Fire Service which claimed 
in 1970 that ’only men with practical fire-fighting experience can properly assess the 
adequacy of the fire prevention provisions made in particular premises, since only 
they have an adequate knowledge of what constitutes the chief fire dangers, the way 
in which fire is likely to behave in the particular circumstances of the occupancy and 
the likely reaction in a fire of people in the building’ (Holroyd 1970: 164).
Experience of fires is what gives fire fighters their particular claim to expertise, 
and such fires also produce two important forms of evidence: that derived from 
collation of statistics of fire incidents, and that based on detailed analysis of fires 
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considered particularly significant. In the UK those fires that attract the work of the 
fire services will produce incident reports that can be compiled and analysed to pro-
vide statistical evidence. This aggregate data provides useful indications of trends 
over time, and variations between jurisdictions (e.g. England compared to Scotland) 
or between different types of building, but these patterns only indicate correlations, 
with any cause-and-effect being a matter of supposition. Moreover, these statistics 
focus mostly on deaths and injuries, and thus fail to provide detailed insights into the 
broad range of fire occurrences (with many small fires unrecorded).
Particularly serious fires, usually those involving multiple deaths, will be inves-
tigated in detail, with the resulting reports often becoming linked to a key failing 
remedied by subsequent regulatory change.1 Such regulations then created another 
significant fire safety knowledge domain, as building codes were implemented that 
placed requirements on designers. For example, the regulations produced following 
the 1666 Great Fire of London outlawed the use of wood for building structures in 
London, and set requirements for party walls that created a barrier to fire spread 
between adjoining buildings (Knowle and Pitt 1972). These building regulations 
then became further strengthened with the development of standard testing of the 
fire-related properties of materials and elements of structure in the early twentieth 
century (Babrauskas and Williamson 1978a, b).
These standardised tests underpinned prescriptive regulations as implemented 
by building designers, particularly following the introduction of national building 
regulations in the UK in the 1960s (first in Scotland, and then in England & Wales). 
This produced a ‘compliance culture’ that equated safety with following rules, albeit 
rules that were often arbitrary, broad-brushed and ambiguous, and implemented 
by designers and regulators who had little understanding of the limitations of the 
testing methods or of the underlying processes involved. Expertise based on experi-
ence of fighting fires thus came to be challenged by an alternative claim to epistemic 
authority based on knowledge of the regulations.
Regulatory roles developed according to the perceived relevance of these two 
forms of expertise. Building regulations assigned design approval responsibility to 
local authority building control officers, with architects typically responsible for pro-
ducing the designs. For these actors, as well as those in the fire services who could 
be consulted in the design approval process, fire safety expertise came to be equated 
with knowledge of how to apply the rules, and with fluency in ‘codespeak’—the lan-
guage of regulation. However, regulation of existing buildings was seen to be some-
thing not so easily encapsulated in rules, instead requiring the judgement of experi-
enced fire fighters. By the start of the 1960s the fire authorities provided oversight 
of the ‘means of escape’ aspects of regulation contained in the Factories Act and 
the Public Health Act, and this key involvement of fire fighters in post-construction 
regulation was further extended in the 1971 Fire Precautions Act.
Finally, during the latter half of the twentieth century, a body of knowledge 
emerged that focussed on fundamental fire science phenomena, creating a new 
1 Examples include: Beverly Hills Supper Club, Bradford Football Stadium, Kings Cross Underground 
station.
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domain of expertise. In the UK this was initially driven by the wartime focus on 
incendiary bombing. Whereas there was little government-funded research on fire 
before WWII, at the end of it the people who had worked on incendiary bomb test-
ing formed the core of the Fire Research Station (FRS). Formerly the Fire Testing 
Station of the Fire Offices’ Committee (a consortium of major insurance compa-
nies), the FRS continued as a joint enterprise of government and insurance compa-
nies after the time of its absorption into the Building Research Establishment (BRE) 
in 1972 (with the involvement of the insurance companies ending in 1976) (Read 
1994: 25).
The work of the FRS drew on knowledge and techniques acquired during the war. 
Alongside data from a wide variety of experiments and tests, it was also claimed 
that ‘the large number of fires which has occurred during the war has provided a 
wealth of fundamental information on the behaviour of buildings in fires’ (DSIR 
1943). This knowledge underpinned work on the Fire Grading of Buildings (initi-
ated before WWII and published in 1946) that would form the basis of subsequent 
regulations, and it helped establish a research agenda that would place FRS at the 
forefront of fire science over the following decades. The FRS was ideally placed to 
influence policy and practice, with its work being central to the development of new 
regulations.
For example, the ‘enclosing rectangle method’ developed by Margaret Law at 
FRS is an example of an engineering methodology used to calculate allowable sepa-
ration of buildings that was based on cutting-edge scientific understanding (and in 
full knowledge of the uncertainties that this brought), but was also communicated in 
such a manner as to establish its use in regulatory practice for over 50 years. How-
ever, despite FRS’s world-leading status in fire science, industrial and political pres-
sure meant that there were regular calls for work to be orientated towards indus-
try’s immediate needs (i.e. compliance testing) rather than ‘blue skies’ research. 
For example, concern about regulatory testing capacity in 1966 led to complaints 
‘that the Station’s work tended to be orientated away from testing in the direction of 
research of a comparatively pure nature and that this tendency would not be offset 
until the Station’s scientists and physicists were leavened by a number of architects/
structural engineers’ (Kendall 1966).
The process of taking state-of-the-art knowledge and embedding it in practical 
building codes generally worked well enough but it did not compel broad under-
standing of the underlying principles. Most practitioners could operate at the level 
of codespeak by following the rules. However, this would prove problematic fol-
lowing the revision of building regulations driven by the deregulatory impulses of 
the Thatcher government. The Building Act 1984 set out functional requirements 
and did not mandate the use of prescriptive rules. Basing the building regulations 
solely around functional requirements that were typically expressed in subjective 
terms (such as ‘adequate’ or ‘satisfactory’) meant that designers were free to choose 
whatever approach they wanted (including the use of rules that were now provided 
as guidance in Approved Documents).
Functional requirements enabled bespoke fire safety engineering, as pioneered 
by Margaret Law following her move to establish a fire safety engineering group at 
Arup. Early examples included the Pompidou Centre in Paris and the new Stansted 
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airport terminal. Another colleague, David Rasbash left the Fire Research Station in 
1973 to become the first Professor at the new Department of Fire Engineering at the 
University of Edinburgh. Perhaps the most intellectually acclaimed FRS scientist, 
Philip Thomas, was, along with Rasbash, one of the founder members of the Inter-
national Association for Fire Safety Science. The claim to expertise of these indi-
viduals was based around their scientific skills, their knowledge, and their proven 
influence. The value of the scientific approach was further bolstered by its role in 
identifying and remedying regulatory flaws in the investigations of major fires (e.g. 
the Piper Alpha oil rig and the Kings Cross tube station).
The fire science discipline that was built through these activities (in the UK, and 
notably in the USA and Japan) was replete with scientific terminology, significant 
uncertainty, and a continuing need for ‘more research’. In the terminology of Col-
lins and Evans (2002), those with ‘contributory expertise’ used their ‘interactional 
expertise’ to generate rules that could be followed by those who were not conversant 
in the language of the emerging scientific discipline. This was necessary as those 
charged with designing buildings (i.e. architects and increasingly specialised fire 
safety engineers) could not be expected to retrain as research scientists in order to 
propose design solutions.
This brief history demonstrates how multiple sources of knowledge contribute to 
the understanding of fire safety outcomes, thus providing varying types of relevant 
expertise. The range of different types of evidence used for constructing fire safety 
knowledge claims means that ‘ownership’ of fire safety expertise is readily contest-
able. Claims to fire safety expertise can be seen as bounded by two extremes that 
derive from direct empirical experience of fire phenomena. For fire fighters this is 
the experience of fighting fires, while for fire scientists (and science-based fire safety 
engineers) it is the experience of the experimental laboratory. However, those with 
expertise in regulatory compliance continue to constitute a powerful third group. 
Codespeak remains central to regulation in England and Wales because although 
the 1985 Building Regulations set out functional requirements, these were backed 
up by guidance for common types of buildings in the form of Approved Documents. 
As the Hackitt Review notes, ‘the cumulative impact of the Approved Documents 
changes an outcome based system of regulation to one that is often inferred by users 
to be prescriptive’ (Hackitt 2018: 26).
This third group derives its claim to epistemic authority from fire safety’s prag-
matic origins where rule-based regulation preceded fundamental scientific investiga-
tions, and the continuing need for translation from science to application provides 
a role for those who are conversant in the language of the rules and standards. This 
form of knowledge is particularly interesting as it requires no direct experience of 
fire. People with this form of knowledge have not fought fires (like the fire service); 
they have not studied fires (like the research scientists). Instead their ‘knowledge’ 
is derived entirely from the societally constructed forms of regulation, codes, and 
standards. This third category therefore has a particular advantage with respect to 
the certainty with which they hold their knowledge—because the codes and stand-
ards were created precisely for the purpose of providing clarity. These regulatory 
experts thus reside in the ‘certainty trough’ (MacKenzie 1998), slightly removed 
from the site of knowledge production, and with the lowest perceived uncertainty 
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as to related knowledge claims. They are also sufficiently conversant with the field 
to pass as experts. However, this type of knowledge is isolated from knowledge pro-
duction—since the language of regulation and the language of science have been 
purposely made different. It is not that the practitioner has basic ‘conversational fire 
science’, whereas the scientist is ‘fluent’—they are speaking a different language. 
The claim to epistemic authority of individuals with this type of knowledge is fur-
ther bolstered not just by the lack of ambiguity, but also the legal authority given by 
the state to the codes and standards. Codespeak provides a common language for 
a range of disparate practitioners to talk about fire safety (providing what Galison 
(1997) terms a ‘trading zone’).
For example, to be confident that they can satisfy the functional requirements set 
out in the Building Regulations requires a fire safety engineer to have the educa-
tional background to understand fire phenomena, structural performance and evacu-
ation behavior, but the practicalities of working in industry also requires fluency in 
codespeak. In practice, many current fire safety engineers may find that, when it 
comes to their day-to-day business, the language of codespeak is far more useful 
than the language of science—because it is in this language that they can converse 
with the other stakeholders in the built environment (e.g. architects, building control 
officers, and fire service personnel), and also because it allows their decision mak-
ing to reside in the trough of certainty—unsullied by scientific ambiguity. However, 
while the fire safety engineer may find it useful to reside in this space, they can-
not (unchallenged) claim primacy in codespeak as this is a space where architects, 
building control officers and the fire services have traditionally dominated.
Finally, it should be noted that a fourth claim to epistemic authority can be made 
for those who have direct and sustained empirical experience of the built environ-
ment (residents and other building users) even if they have no relevant experience 
of fire or fire safety regulation. It is a long-standing principle of Health and Safety 
(embedded in UK legislation in 19742) that the operators and users of buildings 
(ranging from industrial plants to shops) are best-placed to understand and mitigate 
the risks involved. The Health and Safety Executive thus advises that those who 
work in a building should be consulted as part of the process of risk assessment 
because they ‘are often the best people to understand risks in the workplace and 
involving them in making decisions shows them that you take their health and safety 
seriously’ (HSE 2014: 5). The same logic applies to residents, including those of 
multi-apartment residential buildings. Firsthand experience of the practicalities of 
the solutions wrought by the other experts, and day-to-day delivery of fire safety 
measures within a building creates its own claim to knowledge. While other experts 
may be able to profess expertise of how it should be, the users of a building will 
have an intimate knowledge of the actual operation of their homes. For example, 
risks associated with blocked or otherwise non-functioning evacuation routes and 
accumulations of flammable material in stairways can be most readily observed by 
residents.
2 In the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974.
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In fire safety, at least in the UK, this fourth type of claim to epistemic author-
ity has acquired prominence due to the evidence that Grenfell Tower residents were 
aware of many of the fire safety deficiencies within the building. The influential 
Hackitt review, established by the government following Grenfell, recommended 
that: ‘Residents should be involved in the decision-making process for work that can 
impact on the safety of their homes’ (Hackitt 2018: 64). However, such ‘local exper-
tise’ (a more appropriate term than ‘lay expertise’) may be overlooked or underval-
ued because those who possess this form of expertise lack the necessary ‘interac-
tional expertise’ with which to communicate effectively with other experts (such as 
engineers and the fire services), and vice versa (Collins and Evans 2002: 261).
In summary, there are four forms of fire safety expertise on which claims to epis-
temic authority can be based:
• Authority based on first-hand experience of fighting fires—former or current fire 
service personnel;
• Authority based on study of fire phenomena—fire science researchers;
• Authority based on fluency in codespeak—practitioners who apply codes and 
standards;
• Authority based on first-hand experience of using a building—residents and 
building managers.
However, as argued in the previous section, expertise alone does not determine 
expertness. As our typology of four types of fire safety expertise demonstrates, 
claims to fire safety expertise are readily contestable. Although individuals may be 
considered experts within their own domain, policy-makers presented with this dis-
parate array of knowledge claims are faced with an ‘ill-structured problem’. They 
must make sense of multiple, competing, performances of expertness. Faced with 
the complex challenge of how to improve the regulatory failings exposed by Gren-
fell, it turned out that the expert advice that resonated most strongly was that which 
provided an apparently straightforward solution.
Expert Advice on Fire Safety
Policy-makers can seek the advice of experts for a variety of reasons. It can be in 
order to rapidly make decisions in the face of political pressure to do something or in 
order to be seen to be doing something while deferring the decision to a later time. 
In addition to informing an evidence-based decision, experts can also recommend 
further research, or provide the legitimisation for decisions that are primarily politi-
cal. An idealised view of the role of experts would see their core role as providing 
unbiased expert advice with the interests of society in mind, and in particular, that 
expert advisers would ‘speak truth to power’. However, it has long been recognised 
that neither the production nor the transmission of expert advice are immune from 
politicisation (Doty 1972).
This paper looks at the differing advice on combustible cladding given by official 
government advisers on the one hand, and by the most prominent alternative view, 
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given by the RIBA Expert Advisory Group, on the other. While the Public Inquiry 
is likely to draw conclusions on the role of regulation in the fire when it completes 
its Phase 2 report (not expected before 2022 at the earliest), it has not to date had 
a direct role in advising government on this issue. Our central concern is to what 
extent these expert advisers conform to the normative expectations described above 
with regard to being seen as impartial and having appropriate expertise. What is the 
basis of their expert status, and how have their competing claims to expertise influ-
enced policy outcomes?
Government‑Sponsored Expert Advice
Following Grenfell, official expert advice on building regulation came from two 
main mechanisms established by the UK government. The Hackitt review into fire 
safety regulations provided a thorough analysis of the regulatory system, and set out 
recommendations for how it should be changed. Meanwhile, the Independent Expert 
Advisory Panel (IEAP) was established by the government on 27 June 2017 with the 
intent that it should ‘advise on any immediate measures that can be put in place to 
make buildings safe following the Grenfell Tower fire’ (MHCLG 2017a). The IEAP 
was chaired by Sir Ken Knight, a former fire fighter, London Fire Commissioner, 
and former Government Chief Fire and Rescue Adviser. The initial membership was 
‘made up of a range of building and fire safety experts’ (MHCLG 2017a), compris-
ing Dr Peter Bonfield, Chief Executive of the Building Research Establishment, Roy 
Wilsner, Chair of the National Fire Chiefs Council, and Amanda Clack, President of 
the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors and a Partner at Ernst and Young. In 
2018, it was announced that Amanda Clack and Peter Bonfield had been replaced by 
Ann Bentley (MBA MICE FRICS, Global Director of Rider Levett Bucknall), and 
Professor Colin Bailey (FREng, President and Principal of Queen Mary University 
of London) (MHCLG 2018a).
The IEAP thus comprises a range of types of experts, covering the full gamut 
of fire safety expertise identified in Sect. 3, with the notable exception of the ‘local 
expertise’ possessed by the residents of social housing tower blocks. As noted by 
the government: ‘The panel have a wealth of experience in fire and building safety, 
including testing processes, and are drawing in wider technical expertise as neces-
sary to inform this advice’ (MHCLG 2020). However, while this panel is presented 
as ‘independent’ it should be recognised that by drawing on those with fire safety 
expertise the panel is, necessarily, comprised of ‘insiders’. While such individuals 
may be independent of government they are necessarily a product of the system that 
led to their appointment.
In his first public statement regarding the panel on the 27 June 2017, Ken Knight 
said that he welcomed ‘the opportunity to work with other experts to ensure that 
our buildings are safe and that we take whatever steps are necessary to ensure such 
a dreadful incident never happens again’ (MHCLG 2017a). This intent to bring in 
other experts was further emphasised on 6 July 2017 when it was reported that ‘ear-
lier this week the panel brought together a group of technical experts from a wide 
range of professions and organisations’ (MHCLG 2017b).
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The IEAP quickly got to work and it was reported that ‘the independent expert 
panel on safety has advised further testing as the next steps’ (MHCLG 2017b). 
The results of these tests were used by the IEAP to produce advice that was 
subsequently issued as guidance by government. Thus on 5 September 2017 it 
was reported that: ‘The owners of affected buildings have been given detailed 
advice drawn up by our independent expert advisory panel’ and ‘We have today 
published further advice that brings together all the results and the views of the 
expert panel on the implications for building owners’ (Javid 2017a).
The advice of the IEAP was cited by politicians as the basis for the various 
government actions that were being undertaken. For example, Communities Sec-
retary Sajid Javid, in a statement to parliament on 20 July 2017, indicated that the 
initiation of cladding system testing was based on ‘the advice of the Independent 
Expert Advisory Panel on Building Safety’ (Javid 2017b). Similarly, recommen-
dations of the IEAP were also invoked by government in relation to more general 
advice. For example, on 14 July 2017 it was reported that: ‘The Department for 
Communities and Local Government has written to all building control bodies in 
England highlighting key Building Regulations requirements when cladding work 
on high rise buildings over 18 metres tall is undertaken’ following ‘advice from 
the Independent Expert Advisory Panel whose members were particularly con-
cerned that further risks are not created in any new works undertaken by building 
owners’ (MHCLG 2017c).
Since June 2017, a total of 23 Advice Notes have been issued by MHCLG, with 
many of these using a form of words that indicates that the government advice 
originates with the IEAP. For example, Advice Note 11 states that: ‘This note was 
developed in consultation with MHCLG’s Independent Expert Advisory Panel on 
building safety’ and ‘The panel have a wealth of experience in fire and building 
safety, and have drawn on wider technical expertise to inform their advice to gov-
ernment, including from experts on building design and construction, building 
control, testing processes, fire safety and fire engineering’ (MHCLG 2018b).
Moreover, the advice of the panel was not limited to cladding materials and 
systems. Concerns about the performance of fire doors were also addressed by the 
IEAP, and on 15 March 2018 it was reported that: ‘To properly understand what 
has happened, the government has: consulted its Independent Expert Panel’; and: 
‘Based on this advice, the expert panel advise that owners of buildings with this 
type of door should review their building’s fire risk assessment and consider how 
quickly these doors should be replaced. The expert panel has published guidance 
to assist building owners’ (MHCLG 2018c).
Based on these statements regarding its activities, the IEAP fits the textbook 
definition of a government expert panel that is intended to DO something. The 
panel’s members have core ‘expertise’ across three of the four relevant catego-
ries of knowledge, thus making them less likely to be susceptible to blinkered 
perspectives or sectoral bias than, for example, the RIBA panel discussed below. 
Being both established by government and then listened to as the key source of 
advice in addressing the concerns with fire safety raised by Grenfell, the IEAP 
has had expertness conferred on it by this relationship.
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This role extended to broader issues of fire safety regulation raised by the Gren-
fell Tower fire with part of the IEAP’s stated role being to: ‘Provide expert advice 
and insight, when required, to assist the department in enabling the implementation 
of the Hackitt Review’ (MHCLG 2018a). On publication of Hackitt’s interim find-
ings the government released a statement from the IEAP saying that: ‘We welcome 
the publication of Dame Judith Hackitt’s Interim Report, which marks a significant 
milestone in her Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety’, and noting that: 
‘The Expert Panel endorses Dame Judith’s call for concerted action and leadership 
by industry, government and other actors in the system’ (MHCLG 2017d). Advice 
Note 15, published on 18 December 2017, notes that it was ‘developed by DCLG’s 
Independent Expert Advisory Panel in response to the publication of Dame Judith 
Hackitt’s Interim Report’ (MHCLG 2017d).
While the IEAP comprised insider experts in fire safety, Dame Judith Hackitt was 
a less obvious choice to lead the Independent Review of Building Regulations and 
Fire Safety. As a former chair of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) she was 
well-versed in issues of risk assessment and mitigation, but not in building regula-
tions. The resulting final (May 2018) Hackitt report reflected this background, with 
an explicit endorsement of the ‘health and safety’ approach adopted in the UK in 
the 1970s of ‘risk being owned and managed by those who create it’ (Hackitt 2018: 
6). Dame Judith argued that ‘there is a strong case for the full effect of the key prin-
ciple of risk ownership and management to be applied alongside building regula-
tions’ (Hackitt 2018: 6). The argument was that ‘the regulator can learn from how 
the HSE has delivered its responsibilities’ so as to ‘manage risk and deliver robust 
and focused safety case reviews in the same way that the HSE undertakes them with 
dutyholders in the context of large-scale chemical plants and offshore oil and gas 
installations’ (Hackitt 2018: 21).
Hackitt’s recommendations were far-ranging but with one consistent theme: 
that regulation should be ‘outcomes-based’ rather than prescriptive. The existing 
approach based on the Building Act 1984 used ‘functional requirements’, and thus 
was not prescriptive in principle. However, as Hackitt (2018: 26) notes, ‘the cumula-
tive impact of the Approved Documents changes an outcome based system of regu-
lation to one that is often inferred by users to be prescriptive’. This then enabled ‘a 
situation where some of those who construct buildings treat the minimum standards 
in the Approved Documents as a high bar to be negotiated down, rather than genu-
inely owning the principles of a safe building and meeting the outcomes set out in 
the regulations’, and ‘has also led some to game the system by selecting which bits 
of guidance and alternative solutions are easiest to achieve’ (Hackitt 2018: 84).
Hackitt thus recommended a stronger emphasis on outcomes-based regulation 
(often referred to as performance-based design in fire safety engineering) rather than 
the introduction of prescriptive rules to ‘fix’ specific problems revealed by Grenfell. 
Although Hackitt brought a distinctively ‘health and safety’ perspective to the prob-
lems raised by Grenfell, her emphasis on outcomes-based regulation was consistent 
with the functional requirements approach, even if her recommendations were too 
vague to provide workable solutions (Spinardi and Law 2019).
However, despite their positions of apparent authority at the heart of govern-
ment policy, the influence of Hackitt and the IEAP proved not to be absolute. While 
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the IEAP endorsed the outcomes-based approach proposed by Hackitt, others were 
more critical. One critique in particular—that Hackitt did not recommend an out-
right ban on combustible cladding—proved decisive in influencing government pol-
icy. Amongst advocates of such a ban, one of the most persistent voices was that of 
another expert panel, one set up by the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA).
The Royal Institute of British Architects Expert Advisory Group
The first public statement by RIBA on the Grenfell Tower fire was made by RIBA 
President Jane Duncan on 15 June 2017. Duncan (2017) said that ‘fire and people 
safety are absolutely critical in all buildings, which is why there must be an urgent 
public inquiry to fully understand how this tragedy occurred’. The first sign of a 
RIBA expert panel came shortly after the government announced the membership of 
the IEAP, with a former RIBA president branding the omission of an architect from 
the government’s panel as ‘ridiculous’ (Waite 2017). Instead, RIBA announced that 
they had ‘convened [their] own expert group on fire safety, and [would] be working 
with [their] members to provide technical and expert evidence to the public inquiry’ 
(Waite 2017).
Soon afterwards, a statement by RIBA indicated that: ‘A small panel of experts is 
working with Jane Duncan and they will issue further information and guidance as 
it becomes available’ (RIBA 2017a). Notes from RIBA’s council meeting identified 
that ‘a small RIBA working group had been assembled to engage with policy and 
regulatory issues arising [from the Grenfell Tower fire]’ and that ‘members were 
keen to offer their expertise’ (RIBA 2017b). On 7 September 2017, this panel was 
named as ‘RIBA’s Expert Advisory Group on Grenfell’ (RIBA 2017c). At the subse-
quent RIBA Council meeting on 28 September 2017 it was recorded that ‘members 
were appointed to the group’ and that it ‘would be advising national government’ 
(RIBA 2017d).
The first public act of the RIBA Expert Advisory Group (EAG) on Fire Safety 
involved its submission to the Hackitt Review, setting out an ‘initial set of specific 
recommendations from the RIBA’ (RIBA 2017e). These recommendations were 
notable in advocating a prescriptive approach to regulation of building design, con-
trary to the intent of the functional requirements approach introduced by the Build-
ing Act 1984. Of particular interest, given subsequent events, is RIBA’s recommen-
dation concerning the use of combustible materials in external walls. On 19 October 
2017, RIBA recommended for ‘External walls of buildings over 18m in height to be 
constructed of non-combustible (European class A1) materials only’ (RIBA 2017e). 
The A1 classification is a product of a standardised testing approach where the 
notional hazard presented by a material or product is ranked. A1 is the ‘best’ clas-
sification with the lowest notional ‘hazard’ with the other classifications being A2, 
B, C, D, E, and F (BSI 2007).
As it became clear that one of Dame Judith Hackitt’s key conclusions was that 
the use of building regulations should be more ‘outcomes-based’, RIBA sought to 
press its case for the opposite, advocating the use of prescriptive rules that building 
designers would be required to follow. In April 2018, RIBA’s EAG on Fire Safety 
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wrote to the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government 
(Sajid Javid MP) ‘urging an immediate consideration of the recommendations laid 
out by the RIBA before the final report is due in May’ (RIBA 2018a). This was 
followed by a statement in May 2018 that: ‘The RIBA’s Expert Advisory Group 
on Fire Safety, set up following the tragedy at Grenfell Tower, had expressed seri-
ous concerns for some time that the Hackitt Review was not going to include the 
changes that are needed now, not tomorrow’ (RIBA 2018b).
In the view of RIBA’s EAG, these changes comprised four ‘baseline prescrip-
tive requirements’ (RIBA 2018a). These were for: ‘External walls of buildings over 
18m in height to be constructed of non-combustible (European class A1) materi-
als only’; ‘More than one means of vertical escape from new multiple occupancy 
residential buildings over 11 metres high’; ‘Retro-fitting of sprinklers/automatic fire 
suppression systems to existing residential buildings above 18m from ground level 
in height’; and ‘Sprinklers/automatic fire suppression systems in all new and con-
verted residential buildings’ (RIBA 2018a).
However, while the advocacy of RIBA for more prescription generally fell on 
deaf ears with regard to Hackitt, one particular recommendation caught the public 
mood. On the day Hackitt released her final report, the idea that the government 
should ‘ban’ combustible cladding became the lead item across the media. For 
example, the Mirror reported a ‘furious backlash’ (Bartlett 2018), the Mail referred 
to the Hackitt report as a ‘whitewash’ (Spillett and Ferguson 2018), and the Archi‑
tects Journal reported ‘condemnation from the RIBA’ (Jessel 2018). The opposition 
Labour Party, the popular media, and perhaps most significantly, survivors and rela-
tives represented by Grenfell United (2018), joined RIBA in condemning Hackitt’s 
lack of support for a ban. In pressing for a ban, the chairman of Grenfell United, 
Shahin Sadafi, noted that ‘many experts have called for it and they need to listen’ 
(Bartlett 2018). Thus began a process that rapidly culminated in Dominic Raab, the 
Minister of State for Housing and Planning, making a commitment on 17 May 2018 
to ‘ban’ combustible cladding during an appearance on the BBC’s Question Time 
programme (Law and Butterworth 2019).
RIBA’s ‘experts’ continued to emphasise this point, stating on 13 June that it is 
‘our recommendation that only non-combustible (European Class A1 only) materi-
als should be used in the external wall construction of existing or new buildings’ 
(RIBA 2018c). On 27 June, giving evidence to the Housing, Communities, and 
Local Government Select Committee with regard to the final Hackitt Review report, 
RIBA Executive Director of Practice, Adrian Dobson noted that RIBA was ‘calling 
on Government to radically overhaul the Approved Document guidance to include 
clear baseline prescriptive requirements for fire safety’ (RIBA 2018d). He repeated 
the call for a ban, stating on the 14th of August that ‘continuing to allow materials 
of “limited combustibility” (A2 classification) is unacceptable in the wake of the 
tragedy at Grenfell Tower and the evidence from the UK and around the world that 
these materials do not provide adequate protection for the public’ (RIBA 2018e).
On 29 November 2018, the government finally banned combustible cladding. The 
‘ban’ required that products should be Class A2 (or better), and was accompanied 
by a list of exemptions. Responding to the government’s decision to ban combus-
tible cladding, RIBA released a statement on 30 November 2018 in which Duncan, 
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as Chair of the RIBA’s Expert Advisory Group on Fire Safety, noted her satisfac-
tion with this outcome: ‘The legislation laid out today is a welcome outcome from 
a lengthy consultation. It is of the utmost importance that we get this right—for the 
victims of such a devastating tragedy and for the future safety of our homes’ (RIBA 
2018f). Duncan’s response emphasised that the ‘ban’ aligned with RIBA’s posi-
tion—saying that: ‘I am pleased that the government have taken recommendations 
on board and broadened the cladding ban to include other high-risk buildings such 
as hospitals, residential accommodation and care homes’ and that ‘I therefore wel-
come the fire ratings proposal for A1 and A2-s1, d0 products which we believe align 
with our research’ (RIBA 2018f).
RIBA’s Expert Advisory Group was a significant voice amongst those calling for 
a ban, and by declaring its expertness and vocally presenting its expert advice it 
appeared to have had a substantial impact on media narratives and, ultimately policy 
outcomes. Although the RIBA expert panel only represented one form of fire safety 
expertise (codespeak), the apparent clarity of its approach to regulation had reso-
nance for both the public and politicians.
Discussion
What is striking about the post-Grenfell role of expert advice on fire safety is that 
the government’s apparent deference to a normative view of experts was so easily 
subverted by a media storm over banning combustible cladding. Such a ban was 
not recommended by the IEAP, and Hackitt specifically warned against the ‘desire 
to “do something” quickly’ driven by the belief ‘that there is one “fix” typified by 
the “if we just do this one thing, it will all be better” response’ (Hackitt 2017: 7). As 
Hackitt argued: ‘Any attempt to modify details of the regulation without addressing 
the clear systemic failings would be akin to adding a paint job and decorations to a 
fundamentally non-roadworthy vehicle’ (Hackitt 2017: 7).
Prior to the ban, post-Grenfell government policy on cladding safety had been 
derived almost entirely from the advice of the IEAP. Together with establish-
ing Hackitt to provide recommendations for reforming the regulatory system, it 
appeared that political decision making on fire safety was completely delegated to 
appointed ‘experts’—with ministers relegated to a role of communicators. As docu-
mented above, day-to-day activities to mitigate the risks posed by existing buildings 
were determined by the IEAP, whilst the longer-term revision of regulations were 
framed by Hackitt’s recommendations. Even after the combustible cladding ban, 
the government continued—for example, in its June 2019 Consultation Document 
Building a Safer Future—to say that it ‘accepted the findings of the Independent 
Review’ (MHCLG 2019: 10).
However, in agreeing to the ban on combustible cladding, the government went 
directly against the advice of the Hackitt Review, despite the Chairman of the 
IEAP, Ken Knight, testifying to the House of Commons, Housing, Communities 
and Local Government Committee that he was ‘much more comfortable to leave 
it with an outcome-based robust test than I am about banning’ (HCLG Commit-
tee 2018: 14). Furthermore, government communications concerning the ban do 
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not seek to legitimise this legislative action by citing advice from the expert panel 
or (notably) Hackitt’s recommendations—with Dominic Raab stating that ‘we 
understand the concern, we’ve listened to the expert review and report but we will 
be looking to ban it’ (BBC 2018, emphasis added).
That government should reject all its official expert advice is noteworthy. Its 
advisors encompassed a wide range of relevant expertise, with the members of 
the Independent Expert Advisory Panel ticking all the boxes of epistemic author-
ity outlined above—with the exception of ‘local expertise’. Moreover, Hackitt 
consulted widely in formulating her analysis, and statements from the IEAP also 
indicate that the members of the panel, while having claims to epistemic author-
ity based on their background, have sought out additional expertise from a wider 
range of sources. Not only is the IEAP able to claim access to broad expertise, but 
it also had its status of authoritative expertness conferred on it by its appointment 
by government. The Hackitt Review and the IEAP thus represent the epitome of 
‘expertness’, if judged according to the definition of Martin (1973: 159) as some-
thing that ‘can only be received from another, a client’.
Instead, the government chose to follow the advice that had been actively and 
consistently promoted by RIBA—to ban combustible cladding. Although the 
RIBA expert panel had no special status as an advisor to government, and repre-
sented a specific sectoral interest, its advocacy of such a ban (along with others, 
notably including the survivors and relatives group, Grenfell United) proved suc-
cessful. While the popular media outcry in favour of a ban, supported by survi-
vors and relatives of the Grenfell Tower fire, was clearly important in shaping the 
government’s decision, RIBA provided the ‘expert’ underpinning with its articu-
lation of prescriptive rules based around material test ratings.
The advice of RIBA’s expert panel reflects the interests of its members in pro-
moting a prescriptive view of fire safety regulation, in opposition to the func-
tional requirements approach that was introduced in England and Wales with 
the Building Act 1984 and the post-Grenfell recommendations of Hackitt. With 
RIBA members typically only being conversant with the codespeak form of 
expertise, it is to be expected that their advice will conform narrowly to code-
speak type recommendations. RIBA’s use of language in arguing for the ban, and 
other prescriptive measures, was telling; it criticised Hackitt’s proposals by argu-
ing that they ‘will not provide clarity for professionals or deliver reassurance for 
the public’ (RIBA 2018b). In other words, in arguing for increased prescription, 
RIBA was arguing for a regulatory system suited to the particular skills of its 
professionals—architects.
Presented with conflicting expert advice, as would be typical for all ‘ill-structured 
problems’, the government found it convenient to follow the approach advocated by 
RIBA. The government’s own experts in the form of the IEAP and Hackitt provided 
complex analysis that did not point to easy solutions. For example, Hackitt (2018: 
26) concluded that effective outcomes-based regulation depended on adequate com-
petence so that ‘those undertaking the work, and those appraising it, will need to 
have sufficient levels of skills, knowledge and expertise to make appropriate judge-
ment calls’. However, she provided no clear route to ensuring such levels of compe-
tence amongst key practitioners (Spinardi and Law 2019).
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RIBA’s proposed ban not only appeared more straightforward in practice, but also 
had popular appeal. Almost everyone has experience of fire, and banning materials 
that are combustible appears self-evidently desirable despite what some ‘experts’ 
might say. RIBA’s claim to expertness was enhanced by offering apparent regula-
tory clarity through the use of codespeak, with epistemic authority stemming from 
the traditional role of architects in building design (and RIBA’s long-standing sta-
tus as a professional body). In contrast, the IEAP had no such institutional backing, 
and there is no professional body that can really speak for fire safety engineering 
because the IFE, while nominally the professional body of fire safety engineers, is 
dominated by fire service personnel, whose expertise is either based on fire fighting 
or fluency in codespeak.
Moreover, privatisation of the government’s fire research activities in 1997 (i.e. 
the Building Research Establishment) means that the government no longer retains 
in-house scientific expertise that it might have drawn upon in the past. The govern-
ment thus had little access to core fire safety expertise in the years prior to Grenfell, 
reflecting the deregulatory impulses of administrations over the previous 30 years. 
In such a context, the claim made by Martin (1973) that expertness can only be 
ascribed by a client may need reappraising. If the state has been ‘hollowed out’ to 
the extent that the client themselves lack sufficient expertise to evaluate expertness, 
it is inevitable that political interests will increasingly hold sway. Independence 
is often seen as an advantageous attribute for expertise—however, if government 
becomes totally reliant on ‘independent’ expertise for the formulation of policy, then 
government itself loses the ability to differentiate between the validity of different 
claims to expertise. When policy-making is driven by complete deference to ‘expert-
ness’, and the state itself no longer maintains core competence, then holders of polit-
ical office may struggle to make rational choices based on weighing the substance of 
‘expert’ advice.
Instead, the basis for governance will rely on a policy-maker’s own evaluation of 
an expert’s claims to epistemic authority, which in fire safety (and probably in other 
domains) is a highly contested space. How can a policy-maker with no in-house 
expertise of their own arbitrate between knowledge claims based on fire fighting, 
science, codespeak, and first-hand experience of using buildings? In announcing the 
ban, government gave primacy to the claims to epistemic authority of RIBA and 
other campaigners rather than to the curated ‘expertise’ represented by the IEAP and 
Hackitt. What RIBA offered in its advice had popular appeal not only because of 
its apparent ‘common-sense’ recommendation to ban combustible cladding, but also 
because it appeared to cut through many of the complexities raised by the advice of 
Hackitt and the IEAP. Whereas the lengthy Hackitt report only served to highlight 
the complexity of the problem with its analysis of the failings of fire safety regula-
tion, RIBA’s advice offered apparent clarity and simplicity with its promotion of a 
ban.
Such a decision will always have a political dimension (as is appropriate given 
the government’s electoral mandate), but choosing the correct means to imple-
ment policy requires expert advice. Judgements about which advice to trust can be 
best made if the state maintains some core expertise, but in the case of fire safety 
the pragmatic goal of regulation of building design gave primacy to expertise in 
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codespeak—a constructed form of expertise that rests on other more fundamental 
types of knowledge. While a key motivation of the deregulation embodied in the 
Building Act 1984 was to enable greater innovation in building design, this free-
dom was not accompanied by sufficient attention by government to the retention and 
growth of fire safety expertise in each of the core areas. Thus, in the moment of 
post-Grenfell crisis, government keenly felt its lack of confidence in its judgement 
of expertness. Ironically, the deregulatory impulses that were supposed to promote a 
departure from prescriptive rules have, in the absence of sufficient expertise, led to a 
popular (and understandable) backlash, and a return to prescriptive rules.
Conclusions
Fire safety expertise is contested, with multiple voices laying claim to epistemic 
authority. Fundamental knowledge claims are bounded by two extremes derived 
from direct empirical experience of fire phenomena. For fire fighters this is the expe-
rience of fighting fires, while for fire scientists (and science-based fire safety engi-
neers) it is the experience of the experimental laboratory. In an effort to dissemi-
nate their knowledge to those without direct experience of fire, these two groups 
have created regulations, codes, and standards. Empowered by legislation, fluency in 
codespeak (the language of regulation) has become its own form of expertise. There 
are thus three practitioner groups that who have apparently authoritative claims 
to expertise. There is also a fourth group comprising residents and other building 
users—the utility of whose local knowledge should also be recognised. The pres-
ence of four categories of expertise each with its own technical (and non-technical) 
language means that there is considerable scope for contestation over who can claim 
epistemic authority and in what contexts.
This means there is no single coherent ‘voice’ speaking on behalf of fire safety, 
creating a challenge for policy-makers trying to differentiate the content of the 
advice they are receiving from any ‘expert’. This diverse range of potentially rele-
vant expertise made it hard for policy-makers to structure their response to the regu-
latory problems posed by Grenfell. The Hackitt Review established by the govern-
ment identified a wide range of failings in regulatory practice, but with solutions 
that were potentially complex and hard to achieve. In this context, RIBA’s advocacy 
of a prescriptive ban appeared to offer a straightforward solution to an ‘ill-structured 
problem’.
The ban on combustible cladding reflects a codespeak approach to fire safety reg-
ulation rather than one based on understanding of fundamental fire phenomenon. 
There is little reason to doubt that such an approach, if properly implemented and 
enforced, will mean that no building so designed will suffer external fire spread of 
the kind that happened in the Grenfell Tower. However, by apparently paying heed 
to only one form of expertise, the government failed to comprehend the full rami-
fications of the ban. By implying that new buildings which did not meet the new 
regulation were ‘unsafe’, the government in effect condemned thousands of existing 
buildings across the UK. Consequently, mortgage providers refused to lend on prop-
erties that they considered to be non-compliant with the new ban on combustible 
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cladding, even if breaches of the new regulation are trivial with regard to fire safety 
outcomes (MacKenzie 2019). The limitations of a rule-based approach to regulation 
were made apparent by the need for competent practitioners to provide an assess-
ment as to whether any external combustible material actually constituted a signifi-
cant fire risk.
In addition, the ban runs counter to one of the key motivations of the Building Act 
1984, which was to enable more innovative building design. Ironically, the advocacy 
of RIBA’s expert group for a prescriptive approach to building design also limits 
the potential for innovative architecture, leaving many architects who favour the use 
of engineered timber frustrated (Cousins 2019). Moreover, viewing the ban as the 
triumph of codespeak over other forms of fire safety expertise has worrying implica-
tions if this means that fundamental fire safety knowledge is neglected—codespeak, 
after all, is derived from these other more fundamental forms of knowledge.
Lacking its own in-house expertise meant the government was reliant on expert 
advice following Grenfell. It sought this by instigating the Hackitt Review of regula-
tions, and by establishing the Independent Expert Advisory Panel. Conforming to 
a normative view of the role of experts, the IEAP proved highly effective at influ-
encing government advice, and political office holders appeared to delegate deci-
sion making power to this group. In contrast, the RIBA Expert Advisory Panel on 
Fire Safety had no formal role and, represented a narrow sectorial interest with one 
kind of epistemic authority (codespeak). Nevertheless, consistent messaging, cap-
ture of the public mood, and the use of an Expert Panel to present an organisational 
rather than individual view (thereby further elevating the credibility of the expert 
advice) allowed RIBA to apparently play a substantial role in subverting the curated 
‘expertness’ of the government’s expert advisers. The very act of this subversion is 
an illustration of how, if the state does not have sufficient ‘in house’ expertise, then 
when faced with conflicting advice from different sources of epistemic authority, the 
holders of political office can be persuaded to over-rule their designated ‘experts’ in 
deference to other forms of expertise.
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